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Abstract
Multidimensional welfare analysis has recently been revived by money-metric measures
based on explicit fairness principles and the respect of individual preferences. To opera-
tionalize this approach, preference heterogeneity can be inferred from the observation of
individual choices (revealed preferences) or from self-declared satisfaction following these
choices (subjective well-being). We question whether using one or the other method makes
a di¤erence for welfare analysis based on income-leisure preferences. We estimate ordinal
preferences that are either consistent with actual labor supply decisions or with income-
leisure satisfaction. For di¤erent ethical priors regarding work preferences, we compare
the welfare rankings obtained with both methods. The correlation in welfare ranks is high
in general and very high for the 60% of the population whose actual choices coincide with
subjective well-being maximization. For the rest, most of the discrepancies seem to be ex-
plained by labor market constraints among the low skilled and underemployment among
low-educated single mothers. Importantly from a Rawlsian perspective, the identication
of the worst o¤ depends on ethical views regarding responsibility for work preferences and
the extent to which actual choices are constrained on the labor market.
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1 Introduction
The recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the measurement of multidimensional
welfare (see Stiglitz et al., 2009, and Fleurbaey, 2009). In particular, the use of subjective well-
being (SWB) be it life satisfaction, happiness or mental health has surged in social sciences
as a broad welfare measure that possibly encompasses many other dimensions than income
(see Senik, 2008, and Clark et al., 2008). Yet, this approach is fully welfarist in the sense
that SWB is assumed to be a proxy for cardinal utility, which can lend itself to interpersonal
comparison and aggregation. This assumption seems too strong for a large part of the economic
profession. At the same time, considerable progress has been made in the measurement of multi-
dimensional welfare based on money metric utility. Notably, the fair allocationtheory suggest
ways to construct welfare indices that only require information about ordinal (non-comparable)
preferences but nonetheless provide welfare metrics that are cardinal and comparable, just like
ordinary income. Hence, these metrics can be used for distributional analyses and potentially
for social welfare aggregation (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2006, 2011).1
Crucially, to operationalize welfare comparisons based on fairmoney metrics, it is necessary
to retrieve ordinal preference heterogeneity from individual data. Several empirical implemen-
tations of the fair allocation theory have naturally relied on the revealed preferenceapproach.
In particular, Bargain et al. (2013), Decoster and Haan, (2014) and Carpantier and Sapata
(2016) have derived welfare metrics in the income-leisure domain.2 Other studies have origi-
nally suggested ways to infer ordinal preferences from SWB data, in particular Schokkaert et
al. (2011), Decancq and Schokkaert (2013) and Decancq et al. (2014, 2015).3 In this paper,
we ask whether the way we elicit preference heterogeneity i.e. from choices or from the sub-
jective experience derived from these choices makes a di¤erence for welfare analysis. To the
best of our knowledge, this question has never been addressed and our contribution is origi-
1With this approach, it is possible to rank individual situations when preferences di¤er while escaping from
most of the standard criticisms about money metrics. In particular, interpersonal comparisons (dominance
principle) are conducted in specic regions of the indi¤erence set that are dened following explicit ethical
priors, making the choice of a reference set less arbitrary than in standard money metrics (see Fleurbaey, 2008).
In this paper, we shall adopt the compensation principle in the domain of income-leisure preferences, i.e. people
should be compensated for di¤erences in their productive abilities, while varying the degree of neutrality with
respect to work preferences. That is, reference wages/incomes will be dened according to specic priors that
favor agents who are more or less work-averse.
2The rst two studies consider preference heterogeneity across countries and across groups within Germany,
respectively. The third paper suggests a rened treatment of unobserved preferences.
3Decancq et al. (2014) suggest a method to construct money metric evaluation of "the good life", incorpo-
rating many dimensions beyond income, based on subjective data. Schokkaert et al. (2011) focus on income
and job satisfaction. Decancq and Schokkaert (2013) and Decancq et al. (2015) follow similar approaches while
focusing on social progress and poverty respectively.
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nal in this respect. Nonetheless, it is closely related to the literature comparing decision and
experienced utility. Recent studies  including Benjamin et al. (2012, 2014), Fleurbaey and
Schwandt (2015) or Akay et al (2015) conclude to an overall congruence between decision
and experienced utility and, when di¤erences exist, provide relatively intuitive explanations for
them.4 Our work further extends this question by asking whether revealed and subjective pref-
erences lead to similar conclusions when used to rank people according to ethically-grounded
money-metric welfare measures.
In the present study, we provide a rst investigation that focuses on a bidimensional measure of
welfare comprising income and non-market time. This domain is crucial for normative analyses
because it is the place where redistributive policies operate, as made clear in the long tradition
of second best policy design and optimal taxation. The bulk of this literature has assumed that
individuals only di¤er in their abilities but have identical preferences otherwise (Boadway, 2012).
Importantly, recent developments in optimal taxation have suggested to respect preference
heterogeneity using fair allocation principles (Schokkaert et al., 2004, Jacquet and Van de
Gaer, 2011, Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2006, 2007, 2014). New attempts to empirically measure
welfare while accounting for preference heterogeneity are also welcome. We proceed here with
the estimation of ordinal preferences that are consistent either with the labor supply decisions
made by observed individuals in our British panel data or with the subjective experience they
derive from these choices, as proxied by a combined measure of income and leisure satisfactions.
The former approach provides revealed preferences while the latter provides what we shall refer
to as subjective preferences.
In Section 2, we present the data and a brief outline of the procedure used to elicit preference
heterogeneity in both approaches. In Section 3, we dene the welfare metrics and explain how
to calculate them using estimated preferences. We focus on the ethical view of responsibility-
sensitive egalitarianism(Fleurbaey, 2008), taking up two polar cases whereby people are held
minimally responsible (Rent metric) or maximally responsible (Wage metric) for their work
aversion. Results are presented and discussed in Section 4. For each metric, we rst compare
the welfare distributions of equivalent rents/wages obtained with revealed versus subjective
preferences. We then characterize the reranking from using one rather than the other type
of preferences. The correlation in welfare orderings is high in around 60% of the population,
for whom actual choices are consistent with SWB maximization. For the rest, most of the
reranking is due to the low-skilled, who seem to work less than optimally, and from single
4The rst explicit comparison has been suggested by Benjamin et al. (2012, 2014), who proxy experienced
utility using SWB and decision utility using stated preferences in a tailor-made studies. Fleurbaey and Schwandt
(2015) confront respondents with a broad range of life choices while Akay et al (2015) compare actual decisions
in standard microdata with the SWB derived from these choices.
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mothers, who face large costs of work. Finally, we nd a fairly large overlap between the groups
identied as the worst-o¤ individuals. Discrepancies crucially depend on ethical views regarding
responsibility for work preferences and the extent to which work hours are constrained on the
labor market. We end the paper with a thorough discussion about the implications of using
particular combinations of ethical views and preference types, subsequent recommendations
and new questions for future research.
2 Estimation of Revealed and Subjective Preferences
We rst present the empirical approach aimed to elicit revealed preferences from labor supply
choices and subjective preferences from SWB information. As we shall see, the estimation
methods are state-of-the-art in their respective literatures, yet with a special care of making
functional forms similar in both approaches. The estimation of revealed preferences follows
the literature on structural model estimations in the presence of nonlinear budget constraints
reecting real-world taxes and benets. The estimation of subjective preferences relies on the
standard approach in the SWB literature, but the functional forms are slighlty more demanding
than usual for the sake of comparability.
2.1 Data, Selection and Key Variables
Data and Selection. Our empirical application is based on data from the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS), a nationally representative survey collected in the United Kingdom
between 1991-2008. It contains life satisfaction information since 1996 and standard information
on socio-demographic characteristics that are used in our estimations. We restrict our analysis
to single individuals, since welfare analysis at the individual level in couple households would
require the estimation of the intrahousehold decision process, which is beyond the scope of our
work. This is not a particular problem since our empirical application does not aim to perform
a nationally representative welfare analysis. We further exclude individuals in self-employment
because their labor supply decisions may considerably di¤er from those of salaried workers and
because income information from surveys is much less reliable in their case. We select people
aged 18 to 64 who are available for the labor market (not disabled nor full-time students or
pensioners). Importantly, we exclude all job seekers, dened according to the questions about
whether they have actively looked for a job within the last four weeks and are ready to take
up a job within the next two weeks. While this steps aims to comply with the labor supply
nature of the model, we probably do not discard all the person facing labor market constraints
(notably the discouraged workers or people not optimizing their work duration), as we will
explain later. Finally, we keep individuals for whom all key characteristics are available for all
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years, and years in which all key variables are available (this leads to the exclusion of years
2006-7). We obtain a sample covering the years 1996-2005 and including 4; 560 person  year
observations.
Income and Leisure Time. The key variables for our analysis are working time and dispos-
able income. Weekly working hours reported in the data are denoted hit, for individual i in year
t. Disposable income, denoted yit, is calculated as yit =  t(git; it;  it), using reported gross
earnings withit (hourly wage rates wit  work hours hit), unearned income it and individual
characteristics  it. Function  t represents the aggregation of all incomes and the imputation of
taxes and benets, using numerical simulations of tax-benet rules of each period t = 1; : : : ; T .
The set  it represents individual characteristics that matter for tax-benet calculations and are
extracted from the data, for instance the presence of children (which conditions the calculation
of child benets, increment of income support, tax credits, etc.).
We shall also use household and individual characteristics to model preference heterogeneity
in our labor supply and SWB estimations. These variables include gender and age, being
single, widowed or divorced, health status (categories very good health to very poor health),
educational level (elementary school, high school or university), being a native or immigrant,
ethnicity (simplied to white or non-white origin), number of household members (mainly
children or elderly dependents), a dummy for the presence of young children (aged 0 to 2),
living in London and personality traits (the so-called big ve, on 1-4 scales: conscientiousness,
neuroticism, openness, extraversion and agreeableness).
SWB. SWB information is drawn from the answer to the life satisfaction questions. The main
one, How dissatised or satised are you with your life overall?, is measured in an ordered
scale between 1 and 7 (1 means not satised at all and 7 means completely satised).5
While it could be used directly for our purpose, we aim to retrieve ordinal preferences that
specically concern the trade-o¤ between income and leisure.6 There is obviously no question
about the relative well-being drawn from these two goods. Interestingly, however, the data
contains satisfaction on life domains that can be combined for this purpose (see also van Praag
et al., 2003, on how to combine the domains of satisfaction). We rely on questions about
how dissatised or satised respondents are regarding the income of your household and
the amount of leisure time you have(also on 1-7 scales). To combine these variables into an
5The data also contains information on mental health (the index from the General Health Questionnaire,
GHQ-12) and answers to the happiness question. These alternative measures of SWB lead to relatively similar
results regarding the estimation of ordinal income-leisure preferences (see Akay et al., 2015).
6Importantly, note that hours of work and gross income (used to compute disposable income) refer to the
last week while subjective well-being indices correspond to the date of interview.
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income-leisure satisfaction measure, we proceed as follows. We regress overall satisfaction of
individual i at time t, denoted Sit, on her income satisfaction S
y
it and her leisure time satisfaction
Slit, i.e. we estimate the equation Sit = 
ySyit + 
lSlit + eit. We then use the predicted value,
V Eit = bySyit + blSlit, as our income-leisure concentratedSWB measure (our baseline). Note
that we have also experimented alternative measures of V Eit , namely nonlinear estimations
for our concentrated satisfaction, heterogeneity in coe¢ cients , or just using general life
satisfaction in place of the concentratedmeasure, as discussed later.
2.2 Estimation of Implicit Preferences from SWB and from Choices
General Model. We proceed with the estimation of ordinal preferences based on either sub-
jective well-being or actual labor supply choices. We present here a summary of the estimation
methods and of the main modelling choices additional details are provided in Appendix A.1.7
Denote  the maximum time available for work (or alternative activities), so that leisure is
written lit =    hit for individual i in year t. The deterministic function of income and leisure
that denes ordinal preferences over these two dimensions is written umit (yit; lit), with m = E
(experienced utility) or D (decision utility). Estimations rely on the identity:
V mit = u
m
it (yit; lit) + 
m
it ; (1)
with a box-cox specication for function umit , the parameters of which are allowed to vary
with the characteristics of individual i at time t, namely dummies for gender, age above 40,
higher education, presence of children aged 0 to 2, living in London, non-white ethnic origin,
migrant, above-average conscientiousness and above-average neuroticism.8 This specication is
presented in detail and justied in Appendix A1. While the specication is common to both
approaches, estimation methods and the assumptions underlying residuals mit ; m = D;E; are
necessarily specic, as we now explain.
Estimation of Subjective Preferences. For preferences elicited from SWB measures, uEit ,
the main information used to estimate equation (1) is the concentrated income-leisure satisfac-
tion index V Eit assumed to proxy experienced utility, i.e. the well-being level experienced by
individual i at period t working hit hours per week and consuming yit. The residual term is
specied as Eit = 
0zit+0i+it to control for individual heterogeneity in well-being responses.
7See also the companion paper Akay et al. (2015), where estimations are used for a comparison of indi¤erence
curves between approaches (overall and by subgroups of observed characteristics).
8Among the personality traits, these two are shown to be what matters the most for labor supply choices
(see Wichert and Pohlmeier, 2010). Neuroticism is a fundamental personality trait in the study of psychology
characterized by anxiety, fear, moodiness, worry, envy, frustration, jealousy, and loneliness. Conscientiousness
is the personality trait of being thorough, careful, or vigilant, implying the desire to do a task well.
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This comprises observable characteristics zit corresponding to the usual determinants of well-
being (cf. Clark et al., 2008),9 individual e¤ects i and i.i.d., normally distributed error terms
it. The individual e¤ect i is not a xed e¤ect in the usual sense, as it would absorb all the
time-invariant characteristics. We rather put more structure on it by making it a function of
the period-average of most time-varying characteristics (a quasi-xed e¤ect à la Mundlak) and
of the big vepersonality traits. The latter have been shown to account for an important part
of the individual variation in SWB (Boyce, 2010, Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001), and help to
clean SWB measures from individual e¤ects that prevent interpersonal comparison (see Fleur-
baey and Blanchet, 2013).10 Utility V Eit is treated as continuous and the model is estimated
by maximum likelihood (to address the nonlinearity of the box-cox specication). Note that
terms zit and i, assumed additively separable from income-leisure preferences, aim to clean
SWB levels from individual subjectivities (see Decancq et al, 2015).
Estimation of Revealed Preferences. For preferences revealed from individual choices, uDit ,
the required information is the labor supply choice, deemed optimal for individual i at time
t. We adopt modern techniques that address the presence of nonlinear taxation in the budget
constraint by discretizing work options (e.g., Blundell et al, 2000, van Soest, 1995). Precisely,
agents are assumed to face (yijt; lijt) pairs, j = 1; :::; J , and choose the one maximizing utility, so
that decision utilityV Dijt = u
D
it (yijt; lijt)+
D
ijt must be evaluated only at each of the J options.
11
As usual in this literature, the random component Dijt is assumed to be i.i.d. and follow an
extreme value type I (EV-I) distribution, such that the probability to observe individual i
choosing alternative j at time t has an explicit conditional logit form that is directly used to
construct the likelihood for maximum likelihood estimations.
9Observed heterogeneity zit includes gender, age (and age squared), education, health status, presence of
children aged 0 to 2, living in London, non-white ethnic origin, migrant, family size, home ownership, region
and year. Remark that some of these variables are allowed here to have a direct e¤ect on SWB but also enter
in income-leisure preference heterogeneity.
10The most problematic aspect in terms of comparability is the fact that self-reported welfare reects di¤erent
levels of adaptation and aspiration. For instance, resilient poor may report high well-being levels while demand-
ing rich may declare experiencing low satisfaction. In both cases, it cannot justify a policy redistributing to the
latter or failing to address the poor conditions of the former (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2014, Fleurbaey and
Blanchet, 2013).
11We use a relatively thin discretization with J = 7 options corresponding to weekly work hours from 0
(inactivity) to 60 (overtime), with a step of 10 hours. For each option j, we specify decision utility as a function
of (discrete) leisure lijt and income yijt. The latter is simulated as a function of the gross earnings generated
by hijt =    likt work hours and the taxes paid and benets received at that income level (see the Appendix).
We set  = 80 hours per week as the maximum time available for market work.
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3 Dening and Retrieving Welfare Metrics
Once estimations are performed, estimated utility functions bumit (yit; lit) are used to derive money
metrics for m = D and E in the ways explained hereafter. Money metrics are calculated for
each individual i and period t in the data using her/his own heterogenous preferences bumit and
assuming she/he reaches the utility levels umit = bumi  yobsi ; lobsi , m = D;E, obtained at actual
choices
 
yobsit ; l
obs
it

. That is, the metrics are dened and calculated on the basis of estimated
ordinal preferences as characterized by individual indi¤erence curves. This section explains the
principles guiding the denition of welfare metrics and the way to derive them (more technical
details on these procedures are provided in Bargain et al. 2013).
3.1 Overall Principles
We use welfare metrics as suggested in the growing literature on fair allocation (see Fleurbaey,
2006, 2008 for the axiomatic derivation and Thomson, 2011 for a survey). The rst principle
of the equivalence approach in the fair allocation theory is nonpaternalism, in the sense of a
respect of individual preferences (and a rejection of Arrows independence axiom). It means
that all the information about an individuals ordinal preferences, represented by indi¤erence
curves, is taken into account. In our case, individuals are assumed to choose a bundle (yi; li)
resulting from the classic utility maximization problem:
(yi; li) = max [ui (yi; li) jyi   (wi(   li); i;  i); li   ]
with tax-transfer rules  (:) determining nonlinear budget sets yi   (wihi; i;  i). The chal-
lenge of the fair allocation theory is thus to dene equality when individuals have heterogeneous
preferences ui over the multiple dimensions of a good life (i.e., in our simple two-dimensional
case, when indi¤erence curves cross in the (y; l) space).
In a relatively general formulation of the equivalence approach (Thomson, 1994), equivalent
situations take the form of a collection of nested sets (Br)2R+, such that r  r0 , Br  Br0.
An individuals situation is evaluated by computing the equivalent set Br, i.e. the set that
would yield the same utility as her current situation. In our two-dimensional case, linearized
budget curves, dened by their slope and intercept, allow indexing equivalent budget sets (see
the rst graph on Figure 1). Formally, the linearized budget constraint of an individual i
choosing bundle (yi; li) on a given indi¤erence curve ICi is written y  ~wil + ei, with virtual
wage and nonlabor income ~wi and e, so that the associated indirect utility function is:
vi( ~wi; ei) = max[ui(yi; li)jyi  ~wi(   li) + ei]:
The ordinal equity concept of egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978) consists in
retrieving a conguration where the actual allocation of individual bundles is Pareto equivalent
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to an egalitarian allocation indexed r, which denes the reference set Br. Fairallocations
imply that this set needs not be arbitrary, i.e. it can be chosen according to explicit fairness
criteria. Then, the second principle of restricted dominance can apply. It connes the domi-
nance principle i.e. a better bundle in all dimensions always reects a better situation to the
reference set. In other words, it allows interpersonal comparison on a subset dened according
to some ethical priors, which we now make explicit.12
Figure 1: Welfare Metrics: Graphical Representation
leisure l
income y
ICa
va
Rente metric
ICb
vb
leisure l
income y
ICa
va
Wage metric
ICb
vb
leisure l
income y
ICi
yi
li
Br
Indexing indifference curves by equivalent sets
3.2 Welfare Metrics
Denitions. In our setting, we consider two cases based on the evaluation of individual situ-
ations according to hypothetical, linear budget constraints, as indicated above. Ethically, they
both give priority to the compensation principle: inequalities arising from endowed circum-
stances (like innate ability), but not due to responsibility factors (like preferences), should be
removed.
The rst one is aWage metric: the reference parameter r will be nonlabor income e and it will
be set equally to 0 for all, so that the money metric is going to be the wage level wi allowing
each individual to reach her/his current utility level. As shown on the second graph of Figure
1, it is simply the slope of the tangent through the origin at the actual indi¤erence curve. This
measure, introduced by Pencavel (1977), is taken up in a few applications, like the recent work
12Decancq et al. (2015) show that with restricted dominance and nonpaternalism, it is possible to dene a
reference set in which we can project the situations of individuals a and b and compare them according to the
dominance principle.
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of Ooghe and Peichl (2010), and is grounded in the fair allocation approach by Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2006).
The second is a Rent metric: r will be the wage rate ew, set to 0 for all, so the metric will consist
of the nonlabor income level i that allow individuals to reach their current utility level. As
shown in the third graph of Figure 1, it is the vertical intercept of the actual indi¤erence curve
in the case of well-behaved preferences. More generally, it is dened as a min criterion, i.e.
the unearned income that would su¢ ce if working did not bring any wage. This metric is
extensively discussed in Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013, Appendix A3).
Normative Interpretations. When equalizing external resources (either wage or unearned
income), individuals will work and earn at their convenience only, i.e. individual responsibility
characteristics, like preferences, are unchanged. However, our two measures embody di¤erent
ethical priors, in the realm of the compensation principle, on how to weigh people with di¤erent
preferences. In fact, the Wage and Rent metrics have been chosen because they represent two
polar cases. With the Wage metric, a situation where all individuals have the same wage leads
to laissez-faire as the best possible allocation, i.e. remaining inequalities are solely due to
di¤erences in preference and are legitimate. Thus, the Wage metric is implicitly interpreted as
holding people maximally responsible for their work aversion. On the second graph of Figure
1, individual b (work averse) is deemed better o¤ than a (hard worker), so b-to-a redistribution
is justied.
In contrast, on the third graph, interpersonal comparison is conducted in a counterfactual
where inequalities from productivity di¤erences are ignored (all productivities are set to zero).
A situation with the same unearned income for all would lead to equal welfare for all: di¤erences
in preferences are neutralized. In other words, with the Rent metric, people are held minimally
responsible for their work aversion so that actual di¤erences in outcome due to preferences 
and not only those due to responsibility factors (wages) should be compensated. As a result,
in our example, this metric supports redistribution towards the work averse b.13
13Our welfare metrics more generally belong to the domain of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, an ap-
proach that helps to rank individuals when their outcomes di¤er because of di¤erences both in endowed cir-
cumstances and in individual preferences. This ethical approach keeps individuals responsible for the latter but
not for the former (Fleurbaey 2008), which can be done along two principles. The rst one is our compensation
principle, that seeks to eliminate inequalities due to nonresponsibility factors (like innate ability), as in the
tradition of second-best optimal policy design. The second, the principle of liberal reward, deems legitimate
the inequalities due to individual preferences. These principles are logically independent from each other but
can nonetheless be in conict. The Wage (Rent) criterion corresponds to the situation where they are most
compatible (most in conict).
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Calculating Welfare Metrics. To bring theory to practice, let us rst formally dene the
Wage and Rent metrics as:
Wi (u; 
r = 0) = min
~wi
[ ~wijvi( ~wi; r = 0)  ui]
Ri (u;w
r = 0) = minei [eijvi(wr = 0; ei)  ui]
respectively (we drop time to simplify notations). The empirical application rst consists in
evaluating the utility levels uEi and u
D
i obtained at actual choices
 
yobsi ; l
obs
i

, which are decision
utility-maximizing. Then we retrieve individual indi¤erence curves for each observation i in the
data. They correspond to implicit functions of y and l dened as umi = bumi (y; l), for m = E;D,
using estimated utility functions bumi . Finally, metrics are calculated by iterative procedures,
i.e. by incrementing hours using very small steps of 0:01 hours/week (note that this is di¤erent
from moving across discrete categories j = 1; :::; J as used for the labor supply estimation). The
Wage metrics is obtained by numerical search of the slope of the indi¤erence curve that equals
y
 l . The Rent metric is simulated as the minimum unearned income allowing us to reach the
indi¤erence curve.
Characterizing Situations when Revealed and Subjective Preferences Diverge. In
Figure 2, we characterize four possible situations where revealed and subjective preferences
di¤er. In graph 1, the labor supply choice occurs on a relatively at portion of the budget
constraint, and welfare evaluations diverge only a little when using revealed rather than sub-
jective preferences (both for the Rent and Wage metrics). In graph 2, di¤erences are larger,
and so is the di¤erence in welfare evaluation (both for the Rent and Wage metrics). Yet, the
contrast between revealed and subjective preferences still does not lead to di¤erent optimal
choices. People indeed concentrate at certain work hours because of kinks in the nonlinear
budget curve as represented in graph 2 (for instance due to the working tax credit in the UK)
or to institutional constraints.
In graphs 3 and 4, revealed and subjective preferences are su¢ ciently di¤erent, and the budget
constraint on a at enough portion, so that actual work hours diverge from what would maxi-
mize SWB. That is, actual hours are "too high" ("too low") in graph 4 (graph 3), i.e. working
overtime (being inactive) is rationalized as low (high) work aversion by the revealed preference
approach while SWB-maximization would imply lower work hours (positive work hours, i.e.
participation to the labor market). These two situations have di¤erent implications for welfare
evaluations. In graph 3, overworking individuals are deemed worse (better) o¤ according to
revealed (subjective) preferences under the Wage metric. The reverse is true under the Rent
metric. In graph 4, quite symmetrically, inactive people are deemed better (worse) o¤ according
to revealed (subjective) preferences under the Wage metric, but there is no di¤erence under the
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Rent metric given the use of the no-work situation as the implicit reference point in this case.
This characterization will prove useful hereafter.
Figure 2: Possible Situations Explaining Reranking
leisure l
income y
IC using SWB
Graph 1: Different preferences, same optimal choice
IC using LS
Actual choice
Discretized
budget constraint
leisure l
income y
IC using SWB
Graph 2: different preferences, same optimal choice (kink)
IC using LS
actual choice
discretized
budget constraint
leisure l
income y
IC using SWB (through
SWB-max choice)
Graph 3: different preferences, different optimal choices (“overwork”)
IC using LS
actual choice
discretized
budget constraint
IC using SWB (through actual choice)
leisure l
income y
IC using SWB (through
SWB-max choice)
Graph 4: different preferences, different optimal choice (‘underwork’)
IC using LS
actual choice
IC using SWB
(through actual choice)
4 Results
We present the results in three steps, bearing in mind our initial objective of assessing whether
the way we capture preference heterogeneity makes a di¤erence for distributional welfare analy-
sis. First, we compare the distributions obtained with revealed versus subjective preferences as
it would be done in a standard inequality analysis (yet, with a broader welfare concept than
income). Then, our main contribution consists in the direct confrontation of the two orderings,
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investigating the possible explanatory channels for reranking. Finally, we focus on a comparison
when characterizing the worst o¤.
4.1 Welfare Inequality Analysis
We start with very basic comparisons of the welfare distributions obtained when evaluating
individual welfare at actual choices using revealed versus subjective preferences. The upper
panel of Figure 3 shows the densities of the two distributions for the Rent metric (left) or the
Wage metric (right). In both cases, kernel distributions look rather similar and log-normal.
The choice-based welfare levels (dashed lines) are slightly more concentrated while SWB-based
welfare levels (solid purple) appear a bit more right-skewed. An alternative representation could
be the c.d.f. or, with the domain of the random variable in [0; 1], the Lorenz curve. Thus, in the
intermediary graph of Figure 3, we show the di¤erence in Lorenz curves obtained with revealed
versus subjective preferences. As indicated in the test statistics below the graphs, we cannot
reject at conventional levels that the di¤erence in Gini coe¢ cients is null, nor that the variance
ratios are equal to one. Hence, the overall welfare dispersion with the two types of preference
measure is similar. Yet, inequality possibly comes from di¤erent segments of the distribution.
Indeed, on the graphs, the Lorenz gap crosses the zero line  i.e. the Lorenz curves cross 
at 40% (60%) of the distribution with the Rent (Wage) metric. In both cases, however, the
distance between the Lorenz curves is almost never signicant along the cumulated distribution.
To directly compare the distributions to one another, we suggest quantile-quantile plots in the
last panel of Figure 3. They compare two distributions by plotting their quantiles against each
other. If the two distributions are similar, the points will approximately lie on the 45 line.
Our graphs show much overlap for rent values below around $30 per week and wages below
$10 per hour, which correspond to the vast majority of observations (i.e. the lower 80  90%
of the distribution). Some di¤erences appear above these levels higher quantiles are more
disperse according to subjective preferences, which is consistent with the density graphs. While
these results are encouraging, a more precise characterization requires to check the degree of
reranking that takes place when using one type of preference rather than the other, which we
now investigate in detail.
4.2 Analyzing Reranking: General Characterization
We move to our core results whereby we directly compare the ranks of each observation accord-
ing to revealed versus subjective preferences, for either the Rent or the Wage metric. Below
each graph that follows, we indicate two summary indices of the overall correlation between
the two distributions, which decrease with the distance between ranks for each observation.
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Figure 3: Comparing Welfare Distributions based on Revealed vs. Subjective Preferences
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The rst, the Spearman rank correlation, is a function of the sum of squared distances between
ranks. The second, the Spearman footrule, is the sum of absolute distances between ranks.
Overall Reranking. For the overall sample, results are presented in Figure 4, for the Rent
and Wage metrics separately. It turns out that the Spearman correlation and footrule measures
are relatively high, especially with the Rent metric. A relatively basic test of whether the two
distributions are similar, in each case, can be performed with procedures dealing with two
dependent distributions. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a non-parametric test precisely
used when comparing two matched samples, or repeated measurements on a single sample, to
assess whether their population mean ranks di¤er. It tests the equality of matched pairs of
observations. It turns out that we can reject that the two distributions are similar in the case
of the Wage metric (p-value of :01) but not for the Rent metric (p-value of :38).
Figure 4: Rank Correlation of Welfare Metrics: Whole Sample
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Note: for either Rent or Wage metrics, the graph compares welfare ranks with revealed versus subjective
preferences, i.e. income-leisure ordinal preferences from actual choices versus from SWB experienced at these
choices. Preferences are modelled using box-cox utility functions with preference heterogeneity (male, age,
education, presence of young children, London, non-white, migrant, conscientious, neurotic).
Sensitivity Checks. In the Appendix A.2, we provide some sensitivity checks for these basic
results. First, we see that results are relatively similar when using alternative measures of SWB
to proxy V Eit . Figure A.1 shows that this is particularly true when adding heterogeneity in the
relative weights on income and leisure satisfactions in our concentrated measure. Admittedly,
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the dispersion increases when using the general life satisfaction measure in place of our concen-
trated measure, which is expected given that the former covers all the dimensions that shape
subjective satisfaction of ones life and hence adds considerable noise to our welfare characteri-
zations. Nonetheless, the Spearman correlation remains substantial in this case as well. Finally,
recall that we pool several years of a panel a choice mainly driven by the attempt to get pre-
cise estimates. Yet, we wonder if having the same persons several times in the observations of
Figure 4 has some inuence on the results. Figure A.2 reports welfare comparisons when using
the time average welfare level for each person in our sample. The picture is very similar to the
baseline.
Interpretations. How can we interpret reranking? There are multiple factors that could
explain the dissonance between revealed and subjective preferences. First of all, the former may
not be authentically "revealed" preferences if observed income-leisure choices are constrained
(for instance by restrictions on the labor market). This could be a conjecture to explain
less dispersion with the Rent metric, if much of the reranking corresponds to situations of
constrained inactivity. Let us illustrate this point using the graph 4 of Figure 2 above. There,
inactivity is rationalized by high aversion to work in "revealed" preferences while subjective
preferences may actually point to higher tastes for work. These di¤erences possibly lead to a lot
of reranking under the Wage metrics. Yet they are simply ignored with the Rent approach for
people at zero hour the shape of indi¤erence curves at positive work hours does not matter.
As discussed in length in Akay et al. (2015), divergences between revealed and subjective
preferences may also come from di¤erent types of optimization errors(for instance, Kahneman
et al., 2006, study how focusing illusionsgive too much importance to income compared to
other aspects of a good life).14 They may also stem from the pursuit of other goals than
short-term well-being.15 An important aspect is that these di¤erences could concern the overall
balance between income and leisure, reecting systematic discrepancies between the approaches.
In Akay et al. (2015), we have shown that it is not the case. As discussed in Appendix A.3,
indi¤erence curves from revealed versus subjective preferences do overlap on average (graph
A of Appendix Figure A.3). However, when looking at di¤erent groups (graphs B-H), some
14Several studies attempt to show the extent to which people make systematic prediction errors regarding the
future impact of choices/events on their life satisfaction, partly because of unforeseen adaptation (Loewenstein
et al., 2003, Frijters, 2000, Frijters et al., 2009, Benjamin et al., 2012, Odermatt and Stutzer, 2015).
15There is also a grey zone between constraints and alternative life objectives, containing aspects like moral
obligations. Working too much(resp. too little) can be due to the obligation of bringing money to the family
(of staying at home to care for children). Alternative objectives may also relate to intertemporal optimization
(ex: people work harder today to secure confortable old days). Clearly, it is not possible to disentangle these
di¤erent factors in a non-experimental set-up (for experimental approaches extracting some of the explanatory
channels, see Fleurbaey and Schwandt, 2015, or Benjamin et al., 2012).
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di¤erences tend to appear, the distributional consequences of which are now explored.
4.3 Analyzing Reranking: Sub-Groups
Reranking within Groups. In order to investigate whether reranking is mainly driven
by certain aspects of preference heterogeneity, we now compare the ranks based on revealed
versus subjective preferences when looking at broad groups dened by gender, age, education or
personality traits. Results in Appendix Figure B.1 show within-group reranking using group-
specic ranks (i.e. ranks redened among observations of the same group, for instance among
males). It turns out that the extent of reranking, i.e. the thickness of the plotted area, varies
across groups. It is particularly small in some cases, for instance among men (for them, the
Spearman correlation is as high as :91 with the Rent metric). It becomes much larger among
women, the young or the low-educated when evaluated with the Wage metric (the Spearman
correlation is still large but goes down to :60  :70).
To check the contribution of each group to the overall reranking, we plot population ranks (as
used in Figure 4), rather than group-specic ranks, in Appendix Figure B.2. Again, there is
consistently more dispersion with the Wage metrics for groups like women, the above-40 and
low-educated (compared to, for instance, men or the under-40). Yet, some groups show specic
asymmetrical patterns, which are intuitively explained by the empirical indi¤erence curves of
Appendix Figure A.3. In particular for gender (graph B in that Figure), "revealed" indi¤erence
curves of men are relatively at, which is the way the labor supply model rationalizes relatively
high working hours for men. In contrast, their "subjective " indi¤erence curves are steeper
(the subjective experience of working long hours should imply relatively larger compensation).
Consistently, for the Rent metric, men are deemed relatively better o¤ according to their labor
supply, i.e. ranked higher in the overall distribution, than according to their subjective prefer-
ences hence they tend to be concentrated above the 45 line in Figure B.2. By construction,
the opposite is true with the Wage metric. A relatively symmetrical picture is observed for
women in both Figure A.3 and B.2, which is consistent with the fact that their work hours are
lower on average and possibly "too" low according to subjective preferences. While gender
o¤ers the clearest example of these patterns, similar interpretations apply to other dimensions
for instance, the highly educated or above-40 show trends that are similar to mens.
Deviations. As discussed above, it is likely that reranking occurs more often when revealed
and subjective preferences diverge in a way that leads to suboptimal choices with respect
to SWB-maximization. To investigate this point, let us call deviationthe absolue distance
between actual and SWB-maximizing work hours. As discussed above, deviations may stem
from bounded rationality, from the pursuit of alternative objectives or simply from labor market
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constraints. Figure C.1 in the Appendix presents the correlation graphs by deviationgroups,
using group-specic ranks. Clearly, reranking is larger in the group characterized by deviations
above 10 hours per week.16 It is consistent with the previous analysis according to which sub-
optimalchoices reect large discrepancies between revealed and subjective preferences (graphs
3 and 4 in Figure 2). In Figure C.2, we focus on the group showing deviations larger than 10
hours per week. We represent rst those who "underwork" while being inactive (as in graph 4 of
Figure 2), those who "underwork" in part-time activities, and nally those who "overwork" (as
in graph 3 of Figure 2). Inactivity seems to be the situation generating the highest dispersion
under the Wage metric (the Spearman correlation goes as low as :42) while it is relatively
harmless for the Rent metric comparison (using one type of preference or the other is neutral
in this case, as discussed above).17
Subgroup Contributions. We nally combine these di¤erent dimensions to better charac-
terize the channels of reranking. We consider subgroups dened by a combination of gender,
education and age levels. We denote M (F) for male (female), H (L) for high (low) education,
and Y (O) for below (above) 40 years of age. Among young low-educated women (F-L-Y), we
also di¤erentiate between those with children (F-L-Y-C) and those without (F-L-Y-N). We then
report the individual contribution of each group to total reranking on Figure 5 for the Rent
metric and Figure 6 for the Wage metric. Groups enter the picture by increasing order of their
contribution to total deviation, from M-H-Y (representing 5% of the sample but contributing
to 3% of total deviation) to F-L-Y (representing 23% of the sample but contributing to 30%
of total deviation). In each Figure, we add one group at a time its contribution is plotted in
red while neutralizing reranking for the groups not yet entered (their observations are on the
45 line). We report the overall Spearman correlation and footrule at each step. For instance,
the inclusion of the 7th group F-L-O in Figure 5 decreases Spearman correlation from :93 to
:88, i.e. a marginal contribution of :05. With both metrics, we observe a very high correlation
in most subgroups but a faster drop in the Spearman measures when introducing F-L-O and
F-L-Y-C (the contribution of M-L-O also seems important with the Wage metric). There is no
reason for these groups to be a¤ected by limited rationality or alternative life goals more than
the rest of the population. Instead, this decomposition conveys that most of the reranking is
attached to groups that potentially su¤er from specic labor market constraints related to low
skills and possible other dimensions (gender).
16Notice than 10 hours is the step used for hour discretization in our labor supply model, so that deviations
below 10 hours may just be due to the approximation induced by this (standard) modelling choice.
17We do not expect more dispersion with the Wage metric than with the Rent metric when considering other
cases. Consistently, we see that "underwork" at part-time gives similar dispersion with both metrics while
"overwork" actually shows more dispersion with the Rent metric.
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Figure 5: Re-ranking by Cumulative Demographic Subgroups (Rent Metric)
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Note: the graphs compare Rent metric ranks obtained using revealed versus subjective preferences. Observations
are grouped by subgroups dened by M (F) for male (female), H (L) for high (low) education, and Y (O) for
below (above) 40 years of age. In the rst graph, the contribution of the rst group is assessed by imposing
no-reranking among other groups (welfare rank under subjective preference is set equal to the one under revealed
preference, i.e. these groups are on the 45 line). In the following graphs, the actual contribution of each other
group is consecutively added.
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Figure 6: Re-ranking by Cumulative Demographic Subgroups (Wage Metric)
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Note: the graphs compare Wage metric ranks obtained using revealed versus subjective preferences. Observa-
tions are grouped by subgroups dened by M (F) for male (female), H (L) for high (low) education, and Y
(O) for below (above) 40 years of age. In the rst graph, the contribution of the rst group is assessed by
imposing no-reranking among other groups (welfare rank under subjective preference is set equal to the one
under revealed preference, i.e. these groups are on the 45 line). In the following graphs, the actual contribution
of each other group is consecutively added.
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These results are summarized in Table 1. The rst two columns present the distribution by
groups in the sample and the proportion of large deviations (>10 hours/week) in each group
(it is 40% in the overall population). The third column shows the distribution of contributors
to the total number of large deviations.18 Three groups previously mentioned, M-L-O, F-L-O
and F-L-Y-C, account for 74% of large deviations. The next four columns, summing to 1,
show the breakdown by type of deviation in the population characterized by large deviation.
The role of underwork and overwork is relatively balanced overall (and among low-skilled older
women) while the contribution of single mothers is clearly associated with underemployment,
and particularly with complete inactivity. The last four columns of Table 1 rst report, for
each metric, the total reranking (in italic), calculated as one minus the Spearman footrule.
Below, we report the contribution of each subgroup to total reranking. It is simply extracted
from Figures 5 and 6 as the marginal change in Spearman footrule associated with adding this
group (for instance, a marginal contribution of :05 for group F-L-O under the Rent metric, as
examplied before), expressed in percentage of total reranking. Note that this approach yields
a perfect decomposition of total reranking, which is not sensitive to the order of decomposition
(and is actually identical to one where we extract the contribution of each group at a time by
neutralizing all other groups).19
Results conrm that reranking is closely associated to large deviations (the correlation between
the contribution to the former and the contribution to the latter is :98 for the Rent and :92
for the Wage, as indicated in the lower part of the table). Among the main contributors to
reranking, it turns out that low-educated men and women, especially older, are characterized by
overwork. While overwork may be related to focusing illusionor high aspirations (cf. Akay et
al., 2015), a more likely set of explanations pertains to the role of labor markets. In particular,
low-skilled workers may avail of less exible jobs (no possibility of part-time work, for instance),
tighter budget constraints and/or genuinely higher work aversion (due to the bad quality of jobs
they can nd). Older low-skilled women are also substantial contributors through underwork,
which may be related to gender discrimination (see Petrongolo, 2004) and rationing out of the
labor market due to depreciated skills after long-term unemployment. The largest contributor
is the group of low-skilled single mother, who cumulate the di¢ culties described above with
low work incentives due to childcare costs.20 As expected, their contribution to reranking is
largest with the Wage metric since the Rent metric does not generate reranking in the case of
18As in the previous gures, the groups are ordered by contribution to total deviation. A similar order is
obtained when using the proportion of large deviation or unreported the average level of absolute deviation,
with the exception of M-L-Y (the latter has the lowest rate of high deviation but is a relatively large group).
19This is not the case with the Spearman correlation, which is sensitive to the order of decomposition. Shapley
values could be calculated but it would require to compute contributions for the 362,880 permutations of the 9
subgroups.
20The UK is often described as a country with little support for maternal employment due to little public
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unemployment, as previously discussed. The last rows of the table indicate that contribution to
reranking is particularly correlated with contribution to underwork (more than with overwork)
and, as expected, that this is even more so with the Wage metric. This result is mainly due to
single mothers. More generally, without this group, the Spearman footrule would be as high as
:83 with the Rent and :77 with the Wage, which are the levels obtained in the population with
zero deviation (rst graph of Figure C.1).
Table 1: Re-ranking by Socio-Demographic Sub-Groups
Rent Wage
Total 31% 16% 2% 50%M-H-Y 5% 25% 3% 0% 0% 0% 3% 5% 3%F-H-O 4% 33% 4% 0.5% 1% 0% 2% 5% 6%M-H-O 4% 34% 4% 0% 0% 0% 3% 5% 3%F-H-Y 5% 43% 6% 0.4% 1% 2% 2% 5% 3%M-L-Y 16% 18% 7% 2% 1% 0% 5% 9% 12%M-L-O 18% 43% 20% 3% 0% 0% 16% 18% 18%F-L-O 25% 45% 28% 8% 6% 0% 14% 23% 21%F-L-Y-N 7% 21% 4% 1% 1% 0% 2% 9% 3%F-L-Y-C 16% 64% 26% 16% 7% 0% 2% 23% 32%Correlation	between	contribution	to	reranking	and	contribution	to......large	deviations 0.98 0.92...large	deviations	(underwork,	0	hours)	 0.85 0.94...large	deviations	(whole	underwork)	 0.83 0.91...large	deviations	(overwork) 0.63 0.42
0.22 0.34
Contribution	to	overall	reranking	(Spearman	footrule)
Observations are grouped by combined socio-demographic characteristics denoted by: M (F) for male (female),L (H) for low (high) education, Y (O) for younger than 40 (older), N (C) for no children (children). Groups areranked according to the % of large deviations (large absolute distance between actual and SWB-maximizinghours). The last 2 columns indicate the level of welfare reranking calculated as 1 minus the Spearman footrule(in italic), and the contribution of each subgroup (obtained for each group by imposing no-reranking among allsubsequent	groups	and	extracting	the	marginal	effect	of	this	group	compared	to	the	previous	row).
100%
breakdown:40%
Subgroup %	of	Total	Sample %	Large	Deviations	(>10) Overall Under-work	(zero) Under-work	(part-time)
Under-work	(others) Over-work
Contribution	to	Large	Deviations	(>10)
4.4 Additional Results
Time Changes. Given the time dimension of our data, we can isole a balanced panel of
observation corresponding to a certain period of important tax-benet changes, for instance
the rst term of the New Labour (1997-2001). We calculate time change in welfare metrics
relative to the mean change, i.e. we identify the relative winners and losers. Results in Figure
childcare provision, pushing maternal workforce into inactivity or low paid part-time employment (see Viitanen,
2005, for instance).
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7 show that the Spearman correlation tends to increase over time, possibly due to a decrease
in labor market frictions and an improvement in the situation of single mothers (see Bargain,
2012). Interestingly, the correlation of the welfare change (indicated by "di¤" on the graph) is
higher than the correlation in levels at any year, especially for the Wage metric. That revealed
and subjective preferences tend to give more similar conclusions when looking at changes over
time is perhaps encouraging regarding their (joint) use for the analysis of tax-benet reforms.
Figure 7: Time Change in Welfare Metrics (1997-2001)
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Worst-o¤: General Considerations. We nally check the prole of the most deprived in
our sample, using the di¤erent welfare measures. This characterization is especially relevant
from a policy perspective, when aiming to target the worst-o¤ in a society. Similar exercises
have been conducted in other studies that attempt to compare welfare measures. In particular,
Decancq and Neuman (2015) confront a variety of measures of the "good life". They show a
high degree of reranking, and almost no correlation in the denitions of the worst o¤, when
using current measures available in the literature. Decanq et al. (2015) for Russia also nd
low overlap between worst-o¤ denitions according to income, life satisfaction and equivalent
income. Given our previous results and the fact that we focus on a bidimensional welfare
measure (income-leisure), we expect to nd more overlap than in these studies. Carpantier and
Sapata (2016) are in a similar situation. They also focus on income-leisure preferences, using
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the revealed preference approach only but a larger variety of fairness criteria. They nd a great
overlap in the identity of the worst-o¤ across these criteria.
Worst-o¤: Overlap across Metric and Preference Measures. We dene the most
deprived as the bottom quintile of the welfare metric distributions.21We rst study the degree of
overlap across the groups identied as worst o¤with the di¤erent measures. Results are reported
in Table 2. Figures in bold focus on the impact of using revealed or subjective preferences for
each metric. Consistently with the previous analysis, we nd a larger degree of overlap with
the Rent metric (71%) than with the Wage metric (58%). We also report the overlap with the
income-poor. It is largest for the Rent metric and revealed preferences. Indeed, the income-poor
are typically unemployed while the value of leisure is the lowest with the Rent metric (minimal
responsibility to those "revealed" as highly work averse). Other gures indicate that ethical
principles underlying the Rent and the Wage metrics play a more limited role in the denition
of the worst o¤ when using revealed preferences (italic) rather than subjective preferences
(underlined). In the former case, 82:8% of the worst-o¤ are common to both welfare criteria,
which is very similar to what is found by Carpantier and Sapata (2016).
Table 2: Overlap of the Most Deprived across Measures
Income Rent,	Rev.	Pref. Wage,	Rev.	Pref. Rent,	Subj.	Pref.Rent,	Rev.	Pref. 0.612Wage,	Rev.	Pref. 0.554 0.828Rent,	Subj.	Pref. 0.565 0.713 0.732Wage,	Subj.	Pref 0.570 0.603 0.578 0.552Cells report the % of overlap of the worst off (bottom welfare quintile)between	two	measures.
Prole of the Worst O¤. Table 3 suggests a portrait of the worst o¤ according to each
welfare measure. We report the mean characteristics of the bottom quintile for income alone (as
a benchmark) as well as Rent and Wage metrics (using revealed or subjective preferences). The
rst two rows concern mean income and working time. The four welfare metrics giving a non-
zero value to leisure consistently identify the worst o¤ as people with larger income but lower
"leisure". Income-leisure satisfaction (SWB) is also slightly larger with the metrics than when
21Note that this is di¤erent from standard poverty analyses that rely on poverty lines, the denition of which
would add another degree of arbitrariness to our characterization. Focusing on the bottom 20% of the well-being
distributions, as we do, allows comparing a group of the same size across the di¤erent welfare measures.
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using income alone. This indicates that the income-poor are more often inactive and, despite
enjoying more non-market time, report lower satisfaction from their income-leisure bundle.
Considering the other characteristics in Table 3, we notice that the worst o¤ according to
income alone are more likely to be women, low educated and single parents, which is consistent
with low labor market outcomes in this population low wages but also lower work hours that
are not valued in the income measure.
Table 3: Characteristics of the Most Deprived by Metric
Rev.	pref. Subj.	pref. Δ Rev.	pref. Subj.	pref. ΔDisp.	Income 117.2 146.7 155.3 * 150.8 155.9(36.32) (71.47) (69.34) (70.66) (60.91)Hours 13.7 29.5 29.5 31.7 26.1 ***(16.96) (18.54) (17.93) (17.97) (19.11)SWB 4.57 4.69 4.68 4.75 4.65 *(0.84) (0.81) (0.84) (0.82) (0.83)Male 0.28 0.37 0.48 *** 0.54 0.31 ***(0.45) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.46)Over	40 0.52 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.35 ***(0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48)High	Education 0.05 0.07 0.11 * 0.10 0.09(0.22) (0.26) (0.31) (0.30) (0.28)Child	0-2 0.38 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.26 ***(0.49) (0.31) (0.33) (0.22) (0.44)London 0.06 0.07 0.14 *** 0.05 0.01 ***(0.23) (0.26) (0.35) (0.22) (0.10)Non-white 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06)Migrant 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.09)Conscientious 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.34 0.45 ***(0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.47) (0.50)Neurotic 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.48 0.58 ***(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Income Rent Wage
Notes: income is in pounds per week, hours are weekly, SWB is a weighted average offinancial and leisure time satisfactions on 1-7 scales. Standard deviations in brackets. Δ:*, **, *** indicates significant difference in mean characteristics of the worst-off betweenrevealed	and	subjective	preferences	at	the	10%,	5%,	1%	significance	levels	respectively.
Strikingly, the gender and education composition of the worst o¤ varies dramatically across
welfare metrics and preference measures. First, consider the Rent metric. The worst-o¤ group
is more often composed of women, low-educated workers or non-Londoners when using revealed
preferences, while the reverse trend is observed with subjective preferences. The previous rea-
soning applies: These groups are more often charactized by under-work, which is rationalized
as high work aversion by revealed preferences and, hence, higher compensation (and a more
frequent classication among the poor) under the Rent metric. Things are somewhat reversed
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with the Wage metric: with revealed preferences, work-loving "preferences" of males, highly
educated or Londoners (see Figure A.3) lead to higher compensation for these groups and their
more frequent allocation to the worst-o¤ group than when using subjective preferences (consis-
tently, the welfare poor show higher work hours when characterized by revealed preferences).
Inversely, unemployed women with children are deemed responsible for their "work aversion"
according to revealed preferences while they disproportionally make up the poor group with
subjective preferences. For both metrics, we indicate statistically signicant di¤erences in the
characteristics of the worst-o¤ between revealed and subjective preferences. As expected, the
picture of the worst-o¤ is more contrasted across preference types when using the Wage metric.
5 Summary and Concluding Discussion
The literature tends to show that for standard decisions in life (like work choices), there is
an overall congruence between decision and experienced utility.22 Yet, there may be distrib-
utional implications of using revealed preferences rather than subjective well-being. Focusing
on income-leisure preferences, our study suggests a rst investigation of whether the way we
assess preference heterogeneity matters for welfare analysis. Ordinal preferences are elicited
using either actual labor supply choices (revealed preferences) or subjective well-being levels
consistent with these choices (subjective preferences). Estimations are used to derive money
metrics based on a fair allocationapproach in which the compensation principle prevails. We
retain two polar cases whereby workers are held minimally or maximally responsible for work
aversion (Rent and Wage metrics). We nd that rank correlation is high and very high in
groups whose actual decisions are well in line with SWB-maximization. Most of the welfare
reranking seems to be associated with the underemployment of single mothers and the subop-
timalwork hours for low-educated workers, possibly facing constraints on the labor market.
The identication of the worst o¤ also depends on ethical views regarding responsibility for
work preferences and the extent to which labor market constraints a¤ect the low-skills and
those with high costs of work due to childcare.
22Benjamin et al. (2012) show that most (but not all) individuals are able to predict their SWB at the
moment of deciding about (hypothetical) job opportunities. Benjamin et al. (2014a) look at actual (rather than
hypothetical) choices of residency, showing that SWB scores are correlated with the ranking of actual choices
(even if the tradeo¤s between aspects of residency tend to be di¤erent). Fleurbaey and Schwandt (2015) ask
people if they can think of changes that would increase their SWB score. About 60% cannot think of an easy
improvement, i.e. they feel as if they currently maximized SWB. Considering own income versus othersincome,
Clark et al. (2015) nd similar relative concerns in happiness regressions and in hypothetical-choice experiments.
Arguably, more divergence is also found in other recent studies based on job satisfaction (Ferrer-i-Carbonell et
al., 2010), residential choice (Glaeser et al., 2016) or consumption (Perez-Truglia, 2015).
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These conclusions call for further work. We believe that the most urgent question relates to
whether underemployment is involuntary and the extent to which it must be treated as a
non-responsibility factor. This old question should be addressed anew, both econometrically
and normatively. In the present study, we have discarded job seekers deemed as involuntary
unemployed from the analysis. Nonetheless, labor constraints are still present among part-
timers and apparently idle workers (possibly long-term unemployed who are discouraged from
searching or single mothers facing high costs of work). There are many possible ways to "clean"
our estimates from these aspects, yet they all rely on specic assumptions.23 The main di¢ culty
pertains to the fragile identication of what stems from preferences, what is due to actual
rationing (e.g. discrimination, productivity below minimum wage, frictional unemployment,
discouragement or access to low-quality jobs only, etc.) and what is due to false perceptions
about the choice set. The same di¢ culty applies to the modelling of work costs (like childcare
costs) because it is di¢ cult to identify them non-parametrically from preferences (see van Soest
et al., 2002). Also, we are not aware of attempts to identify work costs in SWB estimations.
Beyond econometric challenges, it is certainly necessary to extend the normative treatment of
these questions. A very conservative view may entail for instance that there is no such thing
as involuntary unemployment as one could always create his own (possibly informal) job or
take up any job (even if of lower quality or not matching ones skill). Inversely, unemployment
may be thought of as covering a very broad set of unchosen situations and be deemed a non-
voluntary outcome. The various factors listed above, that possibly explain underemployment,
should lead to specic ethical characterizations. Dynamic aspects should also be considered.
Trannoy (2016) writes: "In the lifespan, maybe we can claim that the degrees of freedom of
an individual are more important but still the analyst has to cope with the dependency of the
trajectory of the individual to initial conditions. An individual starting with a long spell of
unemployment just due to bad luck will have a stigma which will take time to be rubbed out."
Our study has contributed to show that measurement is intricately related to these normative
questions. In particular, the choice of ethical priors may not be independent from the type
of preferences we use and the information contained by these preferences. For instance, if
underwork is constrained, leading to wrong inference about what actual hours reveal, then the
Rent metric, that holds people minimally responsibly for their "revealed" preferences, seems
more appropriate. This is in line with Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2014) who suggest that if work
aversion is partly due to non-responsibility factors, for instance low job quality (unpleasant,
dangerous, etc.) for the unskilled, it may be "prudent or charitable" to choose a low value for
23Many studies have explicitly accounted for labor market rationing, for instance by modelling the probability
of involuntary unemployment (e.g., Haan and Uhlendor¤, 2013), the demand-side of the labor market (Peichl
and Siegloch, 2012) or the distribution of job opportunities (see a modern account in Be¤y et al., 2016).
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the equivalent wage (zero in the Rent metric).24
If theWage metric is chosen, we have shown that the type of preference measure matters a lot
for the unemployed and the underemployed and hence for a Rawlsian objectives of helping the
worse o¤. In particular, if combined to the revealed preference approach, the Wage metric gives
maximal responsibility for underemployment (and maximal value to non-market time) to those
with little or no work. More generally, the Laissez-Faire principle underlying the Wage metric
becomes unacceptable if individual preferences are not fully respectable, and notably if they
reect external factors leading to underemployment (but also overemployment: moral obligation
regarding nancial support to the extended familly, workaholism due to social pressure, etc.).
Thus, it might be wiser to rely on subjective preferences at least on the regularities they
embed to construct welfare measures under the Wage metric.25 SWB measures have at least
the merit to reveal that staying at home causes emotional distress (Clark and Oswald, 1994),
establishing atter and more acceptable indi¤erence curves than choice-based preferences.
In fact, it might be possible to suggest more fuzzy assessments of the correspondence between
"authentic" preferences (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2013) and observed choices. Individuals
may not maximize happiness alone but include it in a grand utility function along with other
arguments (Glaeser et al., 2016). In this case, recent advances that incorporate insights from
behavioral economics into welfare measurement may be transposed to the normative approach,
in the line of Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2013). Further work should explore whether the interval
between revealed and subjective preferences can be helpful to dene incomplete preference
relation (in the vein of Bernheim and Rangel, 2009) and whether the latter can still be used for
distributional judgments on the basis of partial orderings. Another path for further work could
combine normative work with experimental data. The degree of labor market constraint is hard
to measure and to dene in nonexperimental data. Deviationas we measured them could be
seen as a way to evaluate frictions on the labor market, at least by subgroups as dened in
24Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) suggest that involuntary unemployment (resp. constrained part-time jobs)
may be viewed as nullifying (resp. reducing) the agents earning ability, which is what the Rent metric is
doing. The authors add: "the worry that greater work aversion may be explained by disadvantages can partly
be addressed [...] by selecting a low reference wage rate in the construction of the utility index. However,
addressing these issues completely and satisfactorily requires adding the relevant features into the model, and,
for applications, nding estimates of the distribution of characteristics in the relevant population." Few optimal
tax applications address this issue (see the review in Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2014). An exception is Luttens
and Ooghe (2007), who assume that the productivity of the workers deemed involuntary unemployed is zero or
below the minimum wage and that their work preferences can be taken in the neighbourhood of those of the
working or deviate partly from them.
25Yet, it raises new questions. Why should subjective indi¤erence curves be used at actual work hours, if
choice is constrained? And what is the interpretation of the (virtual) welfare evaluation at the SWB-maximizing
hours (something that we have not done here but that is suggested by dashed indi¤erence curves in Figure 2)?
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our analysis (or along other set of heterogeneity factors). Experiments could help to control
for di¤erent factors explaining why someone does not pick up a job or is underemployed with
di¤erent degrees of responsibility being attached to these factors.
Finally, further work should also attempt to use welfare metrics for aggregation in a social
welfare function. After all, equivalent incomes and wages are interpersonally comparable. A
well-known issue is that equivalent measures are not necessarily concave in income and, hence,
may induce antiegalitarian policy implications (see Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988). This is
why we have focused on distributional analyses and welfare ranks. It is the relevant perspective
for the implementation of (progressive) redistribution, which requires a ranking of all individuals
in a society. Note however that the fact that these metrics need not satisfy the Pigou-Dalton
principle everywhere is not necessarily a strong argument against using them to construct
a social welfare function that is less extreme than the maximin. Indeed, the violation of the
Pigou-Dalton principle occur only when indi¤erence curves change shape when utility increases,
in a way that makes the violation of the principle not so shocking.26 Social welfare aggregation
could be pursue more systematically as suggested in Bosmans et al. (2017).
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A Appendix A
A.1 Model Specication
Specication of the Utility Functions. Both experienced and decision utilities are speci-
ed according to the box-cox form:
umit (yit; lit) = 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Used in recent welfare analyses (Decoster and Haan, 2014, and Bargain et al., 2013), box-cox
utility allows imposing or easily checking that preferences are well-behaved, which facilitates
the derivation of ordinal preferences (i.e., indi¤erence curves).27 The paper attempts to retrieve
preference heterogeneity across individuals, so that parameters on leisure and income terms vary
linearly with taste shifters xit and possibly a normally distributed random term i, dealt with
using simulated maximum likelihood. That is, we specify ml (xit; i) = 
m
l0 + 
m0
l1 xit+ 
m
l2i and
my (xit) = 
m
y0 + 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y1xit for m = D;E. Vector xit includes the following binary characteristics:
male, age above 40, higher education, presence of children aged 0 to 2, living in London, non-
white ethnic origin, migrant, above-average conscientiousness and above-average neuroticism.
Budget Constraints. In both approaches, disposable income is computed according to the
budget constraint yit =  t(withit; it;  it) and depends on gross earnings withit, unearned income
it and a set of individual characteristics  it. All these inputs are transformed by function  t
into net income yit, i.e. this function aggregates labor and non-labor income, imputes taxes
and imputes benets. It is approximated by numerical simulations using the tax-benet rules
of each period t = 1; : : : ; T . In the same way, we also predict (yijt;    hijt) pairs for the
j = 1; : : : J potential choices used in the labor supply model. To do so, we rst estimate an
Heckman-corrected wage equation (instrument is non-labor income and the presence of children
aged 0-2) in order to predict wage rates wit (wages are unobserved for non-workers). Then we
numerically compute disposable income yijt =  t(withijt; it;  it) for the J discrete labor supply
values of hijt (see Bargain et al., 2014).
Identication. In Akay et al. (2015), we discuss in more detail the econometric identication
of ordinal preferences and summarize here the argument. For labor supply models, the di¢ culty
27The concavity of the utility function in income and leisure is guaranteed if s range between 0 and 1
(which we impose) and s are positive (which is veried for all our observations). An assessment of the
Box-Cox functional form for labor supply behavior, compared to (more exible) polynomial specications, is
suggested by Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). The use of more exible forms in our context is kept for future research.
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pertains to the role of unobservables that a¤ect both wages and preferences (ex: being a hard-
working type). As in the bulk of the literature, identication is obtained by exploiting exogenous
variation in net wages stemming from spatial variation in tax-benet rules (as in Hoynes, 1996)
and time variation in these rules over 1996-2005 (i.e., tax-benet reforms, as in Blundell et
al., 1998). The period covered in our data includes su¢ cient variation in tax-benet rules to
guarantee identication (see Akay et al., 2015). For the SWB model, the potential bias pertains
to essential heterogeneity, for instance if actual heterogeneity in work "preferences" (xit; i) is
correlated with other unobserved determinants of well-being it. We cannot completely rule out
this correlation but put forwards two arguments. First, we account for some of the individual
heterogeneity (conscientiousness and neuroticism) in both work preference parameters xit and
separately additive well-being terms zit. Second, as in the case of labor supply decisions, the
potential role of omitted variables can be addressed using exogeneous variation stemming from
policy reforms. Precisely, the same person may not make the same labor supply choice at two
points in time because she faces di¤erent socio-scal regimes.
A.2 Sensitivity Checks
Alternative Subjective Well-Being Measures. Our baseline results are obtained using
a concentrated measure of income-leisure satisfaction V Eit = bySyit + blSlit (graph A in Figure
A.1). First, we have tried more exible specications than the linear form, namely the addition
of interaction terms between Syit and S
l
it (the coe¢ cient of which proved insignicant) and/or
quadratic terms. These variants hardly change the results (detailed outcomes unreported but
available from the authors). Second, we introduce some heterogeneity, i.e. we write V Eit =byitSyit + blitSlit with yit = y0 + x0ity1 and li = l0 + x0itl1 (the set of demographics xi is the
same as preference shifters in the model). Again, results are hardly a¤ected, as seen in the
graph B of Figure A.1. Third, we use overall life satisfaction, i.e. V Eit = Sit. Given that the
latter carries much more noise than the concentrated measure, results tend to show a little more
dispersion. This is especially the case for the Rent metric and as summarized by the Spearman
rank correlation see the graph C in Figure A.1.
Time-Collapsing Panel Observations. The main resultats display welfare levels for each
observations in our panel. Estimations were conducted on pooled years in order to make our
estimates as precise as possible and, also, because identication of the empirical model relies on
time-variation in socio-scal rules, as explained in Appendix A.1 When collapsing observations
in time-average welfare levels, in Figure A.2, we obtain relatively similar plots as in the baseline.
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Figure A.1: Reranking for di¤erent Subjective Well-Being Measures
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A. Concentrated life satisfaction
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B. Concentrated life satisfaction with heterogeneity
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C. Life satisfaction
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Figure A.2: Reranking when using Time Average
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A.3 Indi¤erence Curves by Subgroups
We derive indi¤erence curves in the income-leisure space for every individuals in our sample.
For the whole population (graph A) or within each group (graphs B-H), we average individual
indi¤erence curves through a common point set at 40 hours of leisure and y(40) (the sample
mean net income at this leisure level). Results in Figure A.3 show black solid curves for the
indi¤erence curves derived from the labor supply model while the gray dashed curves represent
those consistent with the subjective experience. Weekly leisure points range from 20 to 80 hours,
corresponding to weekly work hours from 60 (overtime) to 0 (inactivity). Indi¤erence curves
with revealed versus subjective preferences seem to overlap quite well overall, i.e. the ordinal
preferences rationalizing actual choices do not di¤er from those implicit in SWB information
on average, while some di¤erences appear when looking at specic groups of the population
(see Akay et al., 2015).
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Figure A.3: Indi¤erence Curves with Revealed vs. Subjective Preferences
Note: Indi¤erence Curves (ICs) are obtained using estimated parameters of income-leisure utility functions,
estimated using either income-leisure satisfaction (subjective) or labor supply (revealed). We use box-cox
utility functions with preference heterogeneity (male, age, education, presence of young kid, London, non-white,
migrant, conscientious, neurotic). These variables as well as additional controls (age squared, family size, health
status, home ownership, all personality traits, region and year dummies) enter the SWB equation as additively
separable controls (hence, not a¤ecting the calculation of ICs). Graphs are obtained by averaging all individual
ICs (using either SWB or Utility) drawn through a common point, dened as (y(40); 40).
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B Appendix B: Reranking by Socio-Demographic Groups
38
Figure B.1: Rank Correlation of Welfare Metrics by Groups (using Group-specic Ranks)
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0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
re
ve
al
ed
 p
re
fe
re
nc
es
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
subjective preferences
Spearman corr: 0.88, footrule: 0.80
Rent metric
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
re
ve
al
ed
 p
re
fe
re
nc
es
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
subjective preferences
Spearman corr: 0.81, footrule: 0.75
Wage metric
Over 40 (N=2322)
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Under 40 (N=2238)
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High education (N=871)
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Low education (N=3689)
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High conscientiousness (N=1543)
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Low conscientiousness (N=3017)
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High neuroticism (N=2249)
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Low neuroticism (N=2311)
Note: for either Rent or Wage metrics, the graph compares welfare ranks with revealed versus subjective
preferences, i.e. income-leisure ordinal preferences from actual choices versus from SWB experienced at these
choices. Observations are grouped by demographic type, using group-specic ranks.
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Figure B.2: Rank Correlation of Welfare Metrics by Groups (using Overall Ranks)
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High conscientiousness (N=1543)
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Low conscientiousness (N=3017)
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High neuroticism (N=2249)
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Note: for either Rent or Wage metrics, the graph compares welfare ranks with revealed versus subjective
preferences, i.e. income-leisure ordinal preferences from actual choices versus from SWB experienced at these
choices. Observations are grouped by demographic type, using overall ranks.
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C Reranking by Deviation Level & Type
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Figure C.1: Re-ranking by Deviation Level (Group-specic Ranks)
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Deviation equal to 0 hours (N=1083)
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Deviation equal to 10 hours (N=1673)
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Deviation over 10 hours (N=1804)
Note: the graphs compare Rent or Wage metric ranks obtained for all observation using revealed versus sub-
jective preferences. The comparison is carried out for di¤erent levels of absolute deviation between actual and
SWB-maximizing work hours, using the group-specic welfare ranks.
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Figure C.2: Re-ranking by Type of High Deviation (Group-specic Ranks)
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Actual choice equal 0 hours (N=567)
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Actual choice smaller than SWB maximizing choice (N=334)
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Actual choice greater than SWB maximizing choice (N=903)
Note: the graphs compare Rent or Wage metric ranks obtained for all observation using revealed versus subjec-
tive preferences. We focus on observations in the group with deviations (the absolute distance between actual
and SWB-maximizing work hours) that are larger than 10 hours. The comparison is carried out for three types
of high deviations, using the group-specic welfare ranks, namely those who underwork while being inactive
(rst graph), those who underwork while being part-time (second graph), those who overwork (third graph).
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